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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5257 
HILLSIDE PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Employer. 
RICHARD M. GREENSPAN, for Petitioner 
WILLIAM M. CULLEN, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 4, 2002, the United Public Service Employees Union filed, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive representative of certain employees 
of the Hillside Public Library. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating unit was appropriate: 
Included: All Page employees. 
Excluded: All others. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held on June 19, 2003, 
at which a majority of ballots were cast against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
Case No. C-5257 - 2 -
voters in the unit who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
•-^^IAASII^-^CA- (F~—^-^-
£1 R. Cuevas, Chairman 
larc A. Abbott, Member 
'John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF RAMAPO STAFF ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- -. ...... 
CASE NO. C-5181 
TOWN OF RAMAPO, 
Employer. 
ANN MARIE BURKE, for Petitioner 
ALAN M. SIMON, TOWN ATTORNEY (JACK SCHLOSS of counsel) for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Ramapo (Town) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a petition filed by the Town of 
Ramapo Staff Association (Association) seeking to represent certain unrepresented 
Town employees.1 The parties thereafter agreed to the creation of a bargaining unit 
1
 The unit as petitioned for included: All full-time and part-time employees in the titles of 
Assessor, Maintenance Mechanic II (Director of Buildings and Grounds), Building 
Inspector II (Director of Building, Planning & Zoning), Town Clerk, Deputy Town Clerk, 
Director of Finance, Senior Program Assistant & Grant Writer, Justice Court Clerk, 
Director of Parks & Recreation, Recreation Facilities Manager (Deputy Director 
Recreation), Recreation Activities Manager, Personnel Administrator, Director of Public 
Works, Engineer III (Deputy Director of Public Works), Director of Purchasing, Receiver 
of Taxes, and Director of Youth Counseling Services. 
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which included several of the at-issue titles.2 The remaining titles were the subject of a 
hearing,3 as the Town asserted that they are managerial employees within the meaning 
of §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).4 After the hearing, 
the hearing ALJ retired from employment with PERB and another ALJ was substituted 
who subsequently issued the decision to which the Town takes exception. The ALJ 
determined that only Edward Dzurinko, Director of Public Works, was managerial and, 
therefore, properly excluded from the proposed unit. The remaining titles were included 
in the bargaining unit sought by the Association. 
2
 The unit included: Maintenance Mechanic II (Director of Buildings and Grounds), 
Engineer III (Deputy Director of Public Works), Senior Program Assistant & Grant 
Writer, Deputy Town Clerk, Justice Court Clerk, and Recreation Activities Manager; and 
to exclude the following: Personnel Administrator, Director of Finance, Receiver of 
Taxes, Town Clerk, and Director of Parks & Recreation. The request for the title of 
Director of Purchasing was not processed due to the fact that it was vacant at the time 
of the pre-hearing conference. 
3
 Edward Dzurinko, Director of Public Works; Brian Brophy, Building Inspector II 
(Director of Building, Planning & Zoning); Daniel Covert, Recreation Facilities Manager 
(Deputy Director, Recreation); JoAnn Soules, Assessor B (Director of Assessment & 
Taxation); and Joe Lanzone, Director of Youth Counseling. 
4
 Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any person holding a position 
by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, except that such 
term shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this article other than sections 
two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this article, . . . persons . . . who may 
reasonably be designated from time to time as managerial or confidential upon 
application of the public employer to the appropriate board. . . . Employees may be 
designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who 
may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in the 
administration of agreements or in personnel administration provided that such role is 
not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment. 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist and 
act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees described in clause (ii)." 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Town excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ who issued the 
decision was not the hearing ALJ and, therefore, could not make the credibility 
resolutions necessary to decide the case and also that the ALJ erred by finding that the 
at-issue employees are not managerial. The Association supports the ALJ's decision, 
but excepts to the Town's inclusion in itsbhef of an affidavit from the Town Supervisor. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth more fully in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here 
only as necessary to address the Town's exceptions.5 
Brian Brophy is a Building Inspector II. His in-house title is Director of Building, 
Planning and Zoning. He is responsible for determining whether a building complies 
with Town building codes. He has recommended that the Town Board increase fees for 
applications to the Town Planning and Zoning Board and adopt a new zoning map for 
the Town. He attends Town Board meetings when there is an issue related to his 
department on the agenda, but he has never been present during an executive session 
of the Town Board. Brophy supervises a staff of several employees, prepares the 
annual budget request, and is the first step in the grievance procedure. He does not 
have the authority to hire or fire employees in his department. 
In 1999, Brophy instituted a requirement that building inspectors keep a daily log 
of their activities. An improper practice charge was filed and, when consulted by the 
5
 36 PERB 1J4006 (2003). 
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x) Town Supervisor whether the Town should agree to a settlement of the charge, Brophy 
opined that the Town should not. PERB found a violation of the Act occurred when 
Brophy unilaterally instituted a requirement in his department that certain employees 
keep a daily log.6 
JoAnn Soules was an Assessor B. Her in-house title was Director of Assessment 
and Taxation. The Town's exceptions state that; after the hearing in this matter Soules 
retired from employment with the Town and the Town hired Scott Shedler to replace 
her. This information was not before the ALJ. The Town has not excepted to the ALJ's 
determination that Soules was not a managerial employee.7 
Joseph Lanzone, Jr., is the Director of Youth Counseling Services. As such, he 
supervises several employees but he does not have the authority to hire or fire 
\ employees8, although he has issued counseling memoranda, in consultation with the 
Town's Personnel Department. Lanzone administers the Town's youth counseling 
program, under the direction of the Counseling Center Board of Directors. He attended 
one executive session of the Town Board where he spoke to the number of resignations 
in his department. He has consulted with the Town Attorney about administrative policy. 
Daniel Covert is the Recreational Facilities Manager and also has the in-house 
title of Deputy Director of the Parks and Recreation Department. He is directly 
6Town ofRamapo, 32 PERB 1J3072 (1999). 
7
 The heading to the Town's exception with respect to Soules states that "Soules was 
Managerial & Confidential But is Now Retired Mooting the Employers [sic] Application to 
have her declared Managerial and Confidential". We do not consider the heading to an 
exception to be the exception and to contain argument which must be addressed. 
8
 He has interviewed prospective employees and made recommendations based upon 
J those interviews. 
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supervised by the Director of the Parks and Recreation Department and in his absence 
would be in charge of the department. He is responsible for the day-to-day operation of 
the municipal golf course and the Town's two swimming pools, supervising 
approximately 50 employees. He recommends to the Personnel Department the hiring 
of 15 to 20 seasonal employees each year. He has fired seasonal employees on 
occasion.He makes recommendations' to the Director, the Town Supervisor and the 
Town Attorney about service contracts at the facilities he manages. He has attended 
Town Board meetings and has been told to stay for executive sessions on a few 
occasions to answer questions about service contracts. 
DISCUSSION 
Initially, the Town's exception as to the substitution of the hearing ALJ must be 
addressed. An ALJ may be substituted at any time by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) for the ALJ previously assigned.9 
In this case, the hearing ALJ is no longer employed by the Board. Despite the Town's 
assertions to the contrary, we find that there are no credibility resolutions presented in 
this record which would warrant the holding of a hearing de novo. We, therefore, deny 
this exception by the Town. 
The Town asserts numerous factual errors were made by the ALJ in her decision 
finding that Brophy, Covert, Soules and Lanzone were appropriately included in the unit 
Rules of Procedure, §212.4(a). See Board ofEduc. of the Union-Endicott Cent. Sch, 
Dist, 233 AD2d 602, 29 PERB fl7020 (3d Dep't 1996). 
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sought by the Association.10 However, even the transcript references cited by the Town 
in its brief belie this assertion. The record fully supports the ALJ's findings. The Town 
further makes absolutely no legal argument in its exceptions in support of its argument 
that the at-issue employees are managerial within the meaning of the Act. 
In State of New Yor/c,11 the Board defined the policy formulation responsibilities 
necessaiy to require designation of an employee as managerial: 
Policy is defined in a general sense as a "definite course or method 
of action selected from among alternatives and in the light of given 
conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions." 
(citation omitted) In government, policy would thus be the 
development of the particular objectives of a government or agency 
thereof in the fulfillment of its mission and the methods, means and 
extent of achieving such objectives. 
The term "formulate" as used in the frame of reference of 
"managerial" would appear to include not only a person who has the 
authority or responsibility to select among options and to put a 
proposed policy into effect, but also a person who participates with 
regularity in the essential process which results in a policy proposal 
and the decision to put such a proposal into effect. It would not 
appear to include a person who simply drafts language for the 
statement of policy without meaningful participation in the decisional 
process, nor would it include one who simply engaged in research or 
the collection of data necessary for the development of a policy 
proposal. 
The record clearly establishes that Brophy, Covert and Lanzone are high-level 
supervisors but it does not establish that they participate regularly, and offer 
10
 We need not consider the ALJ's decision as to Soules as no exception was properly 
taken by the Town to the finding that Soules is appropriately included in the unit sought 
by the Association. The Town's exceptions merely assert that Soules is no longer the 
incumbent and that the duties assigned to her title have significantly changed. No 
exception was taken as to the ALJ's determination that Soules was not a managerial 
employee. The other facts, included for the first time in the Town's brief, are not properly 
before us. 
/ 
11
 5 PERB P001 , at 3005 (1972). 
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information, opinions and advice, in those situations where the employer is determining 
its goals and objectives and the methods and means for accomplishing them.12 Nor 
does it establish that they directly assist the ultimate decision-makers of the Town in 
reaching the decisions necessary to conduct the business of government.13 That they 
offer technical advice when asked by the Town Board is established by the record, but 
there is insufficient evidence that they participate with regularity in executive sessions14 
of the Town Board where policies based upon their technical advice are discussed and 
implemented or that they have any meaningful role in advising the Town Supervisor in 
the formulation of employer-wide policy. They make some personnel decisions but, 
without notable exception, their decisions are not independently made and are usually 
subject to review by the Personnel Department and/or the Town Attorney. 
Based on the foregoing, we find that none of the at-issue employees - Brophy, 
Covert or Lanzone - are appropriately excluded from the unit sought by the Association. 
We deny the exceptions of the Town, grant the cross-exception of the Association, and 
affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS ORDERED, therefore, that there be a unit established as follows: 
Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the titles of 
Maintenance Mechanic II (Director of Buildings and Grounds), 
Engineer III (Deputy Director of Public Works), Senior Program 
12
 CityofBinghamton, 12 PERB P099 (1979). 
13C/Yy of Lackawanna, 28 PERB P043 (1995). 
14
 The Town included in its exceptions an affidavit from the Town Supervisor stating that 
Brophy has attended executive sessions of the Town Board. We will not consider this 
affidavit as it was not in evidence before the ALJ and was improperly included in the 
Town's exceptions. See Oswego City Sen. Dist, 25 PERB P052 (1992). 
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Assistant & Grant Writer, Deputy Town Clerk, Justice Court 
Clerk, Recreation Activities Manager, Building Inspector II 
(Director of Building, Planning & Zoning), Recreation Facilities 
Manager (Deputy Director, Recreation), Assessor B (Director 
of Assessment & Taxation), and Director of Youth Counseling. 
Excluded: Personnel Administrator, Director of Finance, Receiver of 
Taxes, Town Clerk, Director of Parks & Recreation, and 
Director of Public Works. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an election by secret ballot shall be held among 
the employees in the unit found to be appropriate who were employed on the payroll 
date immediately preceding the date of this decision, unless the petitioner submits to 
the Director, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this decision, evidence to 
satisfy the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules of Procedure for certification 
without an election. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employer shall submit to the Director and to 
the Association, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of this decision, an 
alphabetized list of all employees within the unit found to be appropriate who were 
employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the date of this decision. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
) 
~-
<
' '^^t^-<^*^^ — -^~*' ^- t - < 5 " 
ehael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
^) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF HAMBURG 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-22870 
VILLAGE OF HAMBURG, 
Respondent. 
BARTLO, HETTLER & WEISS (PAUL D. WEISS and YVONNE S. TRIPPI of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ROBERT G. WALSH, ESQ., for Respondent 
) BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions of the Village of Hamburg (Village) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), on an improper practice charge filed by 
the Village of Hamburg Police Benevolent Association (PBA), finding that the Village 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
unilaterally implemented a Transitional Work Program (Program) that set forth 
procedures for administering light duty assignments for Village police officers receiving 
benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c. 
Board - U-22870 - 2 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Village excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by failing to 
limit his decision to the five points raised by the PBA and by deciding issues outside the 
scope of the offer of proof submitted by the PBA pursuant to the direction of the 
conference ALJ, and by finding those aspects of the Program are mandatory subjects of 
negotiation. The PBA filed no cross-exceptions. It did file a response to exceptions and 
brief supporting the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ and remand it to the ALJ for further 
processing consistent with our decision herein. 
FACTS 
The facts are few and not in dispute. On or about June 29, 2001, the Village 
unilaterally adopted and implemented the Program. As implemented, it is Order #5-2001 
and is set forth below: 
The purpose of transitional work is to provide an opportunity to officers 
who are injured in the performance of their duties and unable to 
perform the essential functions of their regular duties to remain a 
productive member of the work force. 
The Village, in consultation with the retained medical consultant/nurse 
case manager, will forward a request for medical documentation of a 
work related injury to be completed by the physician of the disabled 
officer. Any officer who is out of work more than one week will be 
assigned a nurse case manager in order to ensure that the officer is 
receiving the best care possible in helping them return to permanent 
duty. Pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c, the officer shall 
attend all medical appointments, physical therapy sessions and follow 
the prescribed medication regime. 
Officers who can physically return to work with restrictions will be 
required to accept transitional work when, in the discretion of the Chief 
Board - U-22870 
of Police, such work is available. Officers who do not accept 
transitional work risk termination of the General Municipal Law §207-c 
benefits. 
All transitional work assignments will be made in accordance with the 
needs of the department. This includes type of work and duration of 
assignment. If, at anytime it becomes apparent that a full recovery of 
the officer is not expected, the officer may be removed from the 
program. 
The officer must continue to provide updated medical [sic] showing the 
current level of disability. Failure of the officer to do so may result in 
the Village scheduling an Independent Medical Evaluation and could 
result in the termination of the officer's General Municipal Law §207-c 
benefits. The transitional work assignment will be re-assessed every 
30 days and job tasks will be correlated with regards to the current 
medical restrictions. 
If the officer's treating physician alleges a permanent disability, the 
Village of Hamburg may request that the officer's treating physician 
complete a physical requirement job description form. Said form will 
list the essential functions of the job along with the physical 
requirement job descriptions of those essential functions. The 
physician will be asked to indicate whether or not the officer can 
perform the essential functions of their job. If the officer cannot 
perform the essential functions, the physician will be asked to set forth 
restrictions. 
The Village of Hamburg may request that a functional capacity 
evaluation be performed to quantify the individual's physical capacities 
as they relate to his/her ability to perform the essential functions of the 
job. The Village may also employ a physician to conduct an 
Independent Medical examination. 
The Village of Hamburg may initiate an application for disability 
retirement if there is medical evidence of a permanent disability. The 
officer may be required, to perform transitional work pending the 
outcome of the disability application. 
The Department will determine the availability of transitional work that 
meets with the restrictions set forth by the treating physician or 
independent medical examiner. The Department cannot guarantee that 
transitional work will be available at all times and for all restrictions. 
The Department also cannot guarantee the duration of the transitional 
work position. 
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The PBA objected to the implementation of the Program without 
negotiations on five points that the PBA argues are mandatory subjects of 
negotiations: the requirement that an officer to be assigned a nurse case 
manager; the provision that an officer may be removed from the Program if.full-
recovery of the officer is not apparent; the provision that the transitional work 
assignment will be re-assessed every 30 days; the provision that the officer's 
physician may be requested to complete a physical job description form; and the 
provision that the Village will forward a request for medical documentation of a 
work-related injury to the officer's physician. 
The ALJ determined that the unilateral implementation of the Program 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act because it raised issues that are mandatorily 
negotiable, finding that the language of the Program was imprecise and two 
provisions could be interpreted to specifically or impliedly condition or potentially 
deny an officer receipt of GML §207-c benefits. 
DISCUSSION 
An employer has the authority to make a determination that an officer who is 
receiving GML §207-c benefits must accept a "light-duty" assignment to continue to be 
eligible to receive those benefits.1 However, once the determination to assign light-duty 
has been made, the employer may need to negotiate the procedures by which such 
determinations may be reviewed and the procedure by which such assignments are 
1
 GML §207-c (3). 
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made, as such issues are mandatory subjects of negotiations.2 As the Court of Appeals 
noted in Watertown, supra, "matters related to section 207-c, but not specifically 
covered by the statute, are mandatory subjects of bargaining".3 The duty to bargain is 
limited, of course, to those matters that are not precluded by GML §207-c (the initial 
determination of eligibility, the right to assign light-duty or to provide certain medical 
reports) and which are otherwise mandatory subjects of negotiations. The duty to 
bargain over GML §207-c is not limited solely to procedures for the review of light-
duty assignments or procedures for the termination of benefits, as argued by the 
Village.4 
In turning to the provisions found by the ALJ to be mandatory, we concur with the 
argument raised by the Village in its exceptions that the ALJ considered provisions of 
the Program that were not raised by the PBA in its offer of proof. We find that the ALJ 
erred in deciding issues that were not before him and by failing to limit his decision to 
the charge as pled and clarified. 
We further find that a review of the provisions of the Program cited by the ALJ in 
support of his decision fails to reveal any language that it is mandatorily negotiable. 
2
 City of Watertown v. PERB, 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB U7007 (2000); Schenectady Police 
Benevolent Ass'n v. PERB, 85 NY2d 480, 28 PERB 1J7005 (1995). 
3
 Supra at 7016. 
4
 See Town ofCarmel v. PERB., 246 AD2d 791, 31 PERB 1J7002 (3d Dep't 1998) 
[hazardous duty pay for light duty officers held mandatory subjects of negotiation]; Town 
of Cortlandt, 30 PERB ^3031, petition to review dismissed sub nom. Town of Cortlandt 
v. PERB, 30 PERB 1J7012 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1997) [procedures for 
implementing GMC §207-c were mandatory subjects of negotiation]; City of Newburgh 
v. Newman, 19 PERB 1J7005 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1986) [demand for benefits 
broader than those provided in GMC §207-c was a mandatory subject of negotiations]. 
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Certain provisions of the Program advise officers of the risk of termination of benefits if 
the officer does not comply; for example, the requirement that officers who do not 
accept transitional assignments risk the termination of benefits and the admonition that 
officers who do not provide updated medical records consistent with the program risk 
the termination of benefits. We held in City of Schenectady,5 "[w]e express no opinion 
as to whether and to what extent the procedural implementation of these two 
requirements [light duty assignments and ordered surgery] might be mandatorily 
negotiable because those questions are not raised in this case". Here, the ALJ 
considered the cited language to establish a procedure. We disagree. The language 
quoted merely parrots the statute even if it does not use the exact words that the 
Legislature did. The employer has no duty to negotiate over the rights provided it by 
statute. 
The other provision of the Program that the ALJ found objectionable states that 
an officer will be removed from the Program if it becomes apparent that the officer will 
not fully recover. The ALJ reasoned that it is not apparent what the status of the officer 
would be after removal from the program. Inasmuch as the employer has the ability to 
offer light police duty assignments by statute,6 we conclude that it has the ability to 
discontinue its offer. Since there is no language in the Program that indicates that 
removal from the Program will affect the officer's receipt of benefits, we cannot interpret 
5
 25 PERB 1J3022, annulled in part, confirmed in part sub nom. Schenectady Police 
Benevolent Ass'n v PERB, 25 PERB 1T7009 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1992), aff'd as 
modified, 196 AD2d 171, 27 PERB fl7001 (3d Dep't 1994), aff'd, 85 NY2d 480, 28 
PERB 1J7005 (1995). 
6
 GML §207-c(3). 
Board - U-22870 7 
this as creating an issue subject to mandatory negotiations. Under the statute, an officer 
otherwise qualified is entitled to benefits whether he is offered light duty or not. 
We find that the portions of the Program before us on the exceptions of the 
Village do not violate §209-a.1 (d) of the Act in that the cited language does not deal with 
mandatory subjects of negotiations. We further find that the ALJ erred in failing to 
decide the issues that were properly before him and we remand the case to the ALJ for 
decision on those provisions of the Program to which the PBA objected in its offer of 
proof. 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant the Village's exceptions and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ and remand the matter to the ALJ for further processing consistent 
with this decision. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
-^l/Ottc/t*. •ZAS 
iel R. Cuevaa, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-533 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN 
of counsel), for Petitioner 
) WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM L. 
BUSLER), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (State) to a 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
placing the title of Forester 4 in the Professional, Secientific & Technical Unit (PS&T) 
represented by the Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF), pursuant to a unit 
clarification/unit placement petition filed by PEF. 
) 
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PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
The Director previously issued a decision on the petition,1 in which he found that, 
while the incumbent in the position of Forester 4, Bruce Williamson, was a high-level 
supervisor with substantial and unfettered discretionary authority for the day-to-day 
operation of his bureau within the State's Department of Environmental Conservation 
(DEC), he did not formulate policy within the meaning of §201.7(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).2 The State filed exceptions to the Director's 
decision, arguing that there were errors of fact and law. PEF supported the Director's 
decision. 
We remanded the matter to the Director for further development of the record to 
address whether the position of Forester 4 was newly created or substantially altered 
and whether the position of Forester 4 shares a community of interest with the other 
titles in the PS&T Unit. We also requested clarification of the manner in which the 
instant case was processed and the rationale for the manner in which it was litigated.3 
1
 35 PERB 1J4018(2002). 
2
 Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any person holding a position 
by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, except that such 
term shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this article other than sections 
two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this article, ...persons...who may 
reasonably be designated from time to time as managerial or confidential upon 
application of the public employer to the appropriate board.... Employees may be 
designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who 
may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to assist directly in the 
preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in the 
administration of agreements or in personnel administration provided that such role is 
not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment...." 
3
 36 PERB P007 (2003). 
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The Director issued a decision on remand,4 in which he found that the Forester 4 
was a newly-created position that the State had initially designated as 
managerial/confidential. The Director outlined the long-standing agreement between the 
State and PEF, approved by PERB, which allows the State to initially designate a 
newly-created or reclassified position as managerial/confidential. Under the agreement, 
PEF may then file with PERB a unit clarification/unit placement petition or a 
certification/decertification petition challenging the designation.5 
The Director also clarified that the order of proof in the earlier hearing had been 
set by him in the interest of administrative expedience and economy and in furtherance 
of the policies of the Act, which favor representation. He noted that, in most 
representation cases, the employer is generally called upon to proceed first as it is the 
employer who is in the best position to provide information about where the at-issue title 
fits within its organizational structure, duties of the at-issue title, and terms and 
conditions of employment of the title and titles in the relevant bargaining units. 
Relying on County of Rockland,6 the Director noted that "in the context of a 
petition seeking the representation of unrepresented employees, it is for the employer to 
present evidence which supports the finding that employees with managerial or 
4
 36 PERB 1J4002 (2003). 
5
 See State of New York, 6 PERB fl3019 (1973). PEF and the State agreed to continue 
the practice outlined in this decision in their July 31, 1984 agreement approved by 
PERB. The Director's decision gives the date of the memorandum of procedure 
between the parties as October 17, 1986. See ALJ's Exhibit 7. 
6
 28 PERB 1J3063, at 3141 (1995). 
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confidential job duties be excluded from the appropriate unit."7 He further found that it 
was not unusual for an employee organization to call no witnesses and to have the case 
decided solely on the evidence introduced by the employer.8 
EXCEPTIONS 
PEF and the State advised the Board jointly that they would not file exceptions to 
the Director's decision on remand, but sought the Board's decision on the exceptions 
filed by the State and the response filed by PEF to the Director's initial decision adding 
the title of Forester 4 to the PS&T Unit represented by PEF. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the Director. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the Director's initial decision9 and will be 
repeated here only as necessary. 
7
 36 PERB 1J4002 (2003), quoting County of Rockland, 28 PERB 1J3063, at 3141 (1985). 
8
 The Director also relied upon a representation at the second hearing by PEF's counsel 
that he had been advised in the 1990's by the then-Director that the employer would 
proceed first in any representation proceedings at PERB arising under the PEF-State 
agreement. The Director also introduced, and relied upon, an internal PERB 
Representation Office memorandum from 1984 that was addressed to professional staff 
and which stated that the employer should proceed first in representation proceedings. 
While he did not cite to Town ofOssining, 32 PERB 1J3013 (1999), rev'd sub nom. 
CSEA v. PERB, 33 PERB fl7013 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 2000), the Director might 
have been addressing what he perceived would be concerns raised if the internal 
practices of the Representation section were not followed in this matter. In light of our 
decision in State of New York, supra note 5, the Director need not have included an 
internal office memorandum in his decision. 
9
 Supra note 1. 
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The parties stipulated, at the hearing held pursuant to our remand to the Director, 
that the Forester 4 is a promotional title in the Forester title series, all of which titles are 
in the PS&T Unit.10 The title of Forester 4 is subject to the same general terms and 
conditions of employment as employees in the Forester 1, 2, and 3 positions. All the 
employees in the Forester title series share a common mission within DEC. Therefore, 
the Forester 4 title would appropriately be placed in the PS&T Unit, unless the "duties of 
the title warrant a managerial designation. 
Williamson, the only employee in the Forester 4 title, is the Bureau Chief for 
DEC's Bureau of Private Land Services. He is charged with the day-to-day operation of 
the Bureau. Williamson supervises a staff of ten in five sections and has an annual 
budget of approximately $2 million, half of which comes from the State and half from 
federal grants. 
Williamson's immediate supervisor is the Director of the Division of Lands and 
Forests (also referred to as the State Forester), who reports to the Deputy 
Commissioner for Natural Resources. Between the Deputy Commissioner and the DEC 
Commissioner is the Executive Deputy Commissioner of DEC. 
Williamson formulates the Bureau's initial budget request, based upon 
recommendations he receives from his staff. Williamson allocates the funds he 
receives, approximately 80 to 90% of his initial request, among the several program 
areas for which he is responsible. Any changes in funding from his initial budget request 
require the approval of his supervisor, but are usually approved. 
10
 The Forester 4 was a title in the PS&T Unit prior to the 1997 title and salary plan 
implemented by the State, which eliminated the Grade 23, Forester 4 title. The plan also 
eliminated the Forester 5 title and revised it to become the new Forester 4 title, 
designated Grade 29, a managerial designation. 
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Williamson has a role in entering into contracts and contract negotiations with 
communities for project work. He approves the contracts, although he is not a signatory. 
There are no monetary limits placed upon the contracts Williamson negotiates, nor has 
the Division Director ever overruled Williamson on any contract he has negotiated.11 
Williamson makes decisions on which Federal grant opportunities to pursue and 
prepares drafts of Federal grant proposals. Williamson and his staff also prepare 
legislative proposals and propose regulatory changes. For example, as pointed out in 
more detail in the Director's decision, Williamson is solely responsible for the initiation of 
a regulatory change proposal which would allow gooseberries to be grown commercially 
in New York, a proposal with significant statewide implications.12 
Williamson has also been formulating a new long-term policy for the direction of 
the State Nursery program. He determines the level of funding the State Nursery 
programs will receive and he decided to halve the production of a certain kind of plant, 
which had a significant impact on the nursery.13 In response to loss of funding and 
experienced staff, Williamson made the decision to eliminate the funding efficiency 
studies for small sawmill operators and to allocate the resources to promoting trade 
shows. 
The record evidences that Williamson's recommendations are followed by his 
superiors without notable exception. He is called upon to provide information to those in 
11
 Transcript, pp.51-52. 
12
 Transcript, p. 31. Williamson testified that current DEC regulations prohibit the 
production of such plants. Major food producers have expressed an interest in locating 
a production facility in New York State if the ban on gooseberry cultivation is lifted. 
13
 Transcript, pp. 16-17. 
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positions above him and has participated in discussions with the Division Director and 
Deputy Commissioner where DEC policy is discussed and formulated. 
DISCUSSION 
Shortly after the 1971 amendments to the Act,14 which defined those managerial 
and confidential employees who would be excluded from the Act's coverage, the Board 
decided State of New Yor/f.15 In that decision, the Board was called upon to define 
formulation of policy within the meaning of the Act. The Board stated that: 
Policy is defined in a general sense as a "definite course or 
method of action selected from among alternatives and in 
the light of given conditions to guide and determine present 
and future decisions." (citation omitted) In government, 
policy would thus be the development of the particular 
objectives of a government or agency thereof in the 
fulfillment of its mission and the methods, means and extent 
of achieving such objectives. 
The term "formulate" as used in the frame of reference of 
"managerial" would appear to include not only a person who 
has the authority or responsibility to select among options 
and to put a proposed policy into effect, but also a person 
who participates with regularity in the essential process 
which results in a policy proposal and the decision to put 
such a proposal into effect, it would not appear to include a 
person who simply drafts language for the statement of 
policy without meaningful participation in the decisional 
process, nor would it include one who simply engaged in 
research or the collection of data necessary for the 
development of a policy proposal.16 
14
 Chapters 503 and 504 of the Laws of 1971. 
15
 5 PERB 1J3001 (1972). 
16
 Id. at 3005. 
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Thereafter, the Board designated a number of positions as managerial and/or 
confidential, including the precursors to the Forester 4.17 
In City ofBinghamton,18 the Board further articulated the standard for designation 
as managerial based upon policy formulation: 
[t]o formulate policy is to participate with regularity in the 
essential process involving the determination of the goals 
and 'objectives"of thegovernment involved; and of the 
methods for accomplishing those goals and objectives that 
have a substantial impact upon the affairs and the 
constituency of the government. The formulation of policy 
does not extend to the determination of methods of 
operation that are merely of a technical nature. 
We have interpreted this standard to mean that an employee is managerial who 
"offers regular and substantial advice on the direction" in which the employer should go 
in offering services to the public.19 Only those employees who have a direct and 
powerful influence on policy formulation at the highest level will be determined 
managerial under the formulation of policy criterion.20 Such an employee "would 
regularly participate in the decision-making process by which departmental objectives 
and policies are formulated and implemented."21 
17The Chief Forester (Grade 28), Principal Forester (Grade 25), and Associate Forester 
(Grade 21) were designated. Since the title and salary plan was implemented, the 
Forester 4 is now a Grade 29. 
1812 PERB 1J3099, at 3185 (1979). 
^City of White Plains, 14 PERB tf4024, at 4043, aff'd, 14 PERB TJ3052 (1981). 
20
 County of Putnam, 20 PERB P059 (1987). 
21
 City of Jamestown, 25 PERB 1J3015, at 3035 (1992). 
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An employee's position in the hierarchy of the employer is certainly one factor to 
consider in deciding the managerial status, but as government changes and evolves to 
meet new service and financial demands, it is even more crucial that the duties of the 
employee, not the title, salary grade or placement on the employer's organizational 
chart, are the focus of our inquiry. A review of the duties performed by Williamson 
clearly establishes that the Forester 4 is a managerial title. 
Williamson's responsibilities are of State-wide scope. "It is not, however, the fact 
of an employer-wide responsibility over a program area which warrants a managerial 
designation, but the nature and the extent of the duties performed by or reasonably 
required of an individual (citation omitted) as a result of that assigned area of 
responsibility."22 Williamson makes independent decisions in a variety of areas of 
responsibility, which are regularly approved and implemented, that affect policy across 
the State. 
In Town ofBrookhaven,23 we designated as managerial an employee with duties 
similar to Williamson, in that she negotiated leases and other contracts, supervised the 
staff in her department, was responsible for her department's programs within the Town, 
and prepared the department's budget, including meeting with constituent groups. 
Williamson negotiates contracts, develops the Bureau's budget, supervises a large and 
varied staff and makes recommendations to the Division Director, which are regularly 
implemented without alteration. 
Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist, 27 PERB P044, at 3097 (1994). 
27 PERB H3043 (1994). 
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Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York,24 lends 
further support for Williamson's designation as managerial. There a Director of School 
Curriculum for a Community School District who had the responsibility for developing 
and establishing the goals, priorities and objectives not only of each subject at each 
level of education but also at each grade level, as well as developing and establishing 
alternative educational programs and hiring and supervising the staff, was designated 
as managerial. The Community School Superintendent relied upon the Director's 
recommendations in much the same way as the Division Director relies upon 
Williamson's recommendations and proposals.25 
It is clear from this record that Williamson makes recommendations and 
implements DEC policy. We have previously found that the definition of a policymaker 
is, and must be, sufficiently broad to include those relatively few individuals who directly 
assist the ultimate decision-makers in reaching the decisions necessary to the conduct 
of the business of the governmental entity.26 By this, we mean persons who regularly 
participate in and influence a process by which the employer makes decisions regarding 
its mission and the means by which those policy goals and objectives can be best 
achieved. We have long considered such persons, who are part of the management 
team or who meet regularly with the management team, to be managers within the 
^ 17 PERB H3054(1984). 
25
 Supra note 17. 
26
 Clinton Community College, 31 PERB 1J3070 (1998); City of Lackawanna, 28 PERB 
H3043(1995). 
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meaning of the Act.27 The record evidence in this case more than sufficiently 
establishes that the Forester 4 develops strategic plans for the State Nursery, forest 
health and protected plants programs, researches and composes Federal grants 
proposals, negotiates contracts, formulates the Bureau budget and makes other 
decisions with State-wide programmatic impact, and is thus sufficiently engaged in 
policy-making so as to make his inclusion in a bargaining unit inappropriate. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant the State's exceptions and reverse the decision 
of the Director. 
For the aforesaid reasons, PEF's unit clarification/unit placement petition for the 
title of Forester 4 is, therefore, dismissed. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
) Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
mjA-61 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
27
 See Town of Greece, 27 PERB 1(3009 (1994); County of Cayuga, 20 PERB fl3024 
(1987). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Avon Central School District 
(District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Ontario County Local 835, Avon Central School District Employee Unit 
(CSEA), alleging that the District had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), when it refused CSEA's demand to commence negotiations over 
Board - U-23450 - 2 
the terms and conditions of employment for unit employees following CSEA's 
certification as the bargaining representative for the unit. 
Based upon a Stipulation of Facts, the ALJ found that the District had violated 
§209-a.1(d)oftheAct. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the findings made by the ALJ on both factual and legal 
grounds. The District's principal exception is that the ALJ erred in determining that the 
existing collective bargaining agreement was not a bar to any further negotiations over 
terms and conditions of employment.1 CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALJ, as modified. 
FACTS 
CSEA filed a representation petition on April 11, 2001, seeking to be certified as 
the representative of the employees in a unit formerly represented by the Avon Central 
School Support Staff Association (Association).2 The members of the Association had 
voted affirmatively on a resolution on March 18, 2001, to disband the Association and to 
seek representation by CSEA. CSEA alleged in its representation petition that it had 
requested recognition by the District as the bargaining agent for this unit of 
1
 The District argues that the ALJ erred by not considering a statement made in CSEA's 
brief to the ALJ in the representation case in which CSEA allegedly stated that its sole 
purpose in filing the representation petition was to "administer the existing collective 
bargaining agreement". We do not reach this argument of the District's because it is not 
properly before us. Argument in a brief does not constitute record facts upon which a 
decision may be based. See Greenburgh #11 Union Free Sch. Dist., 33 PERB fl3018 
(2000). See also Margolin v. Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 20 PERB 1J7018 (3d Dep't 1987), 
appeal dismissed, 71 NY2d 844, 21 PERB 1J7005 (1988). 
2
 The unit includes non-instructional employees of the District. 
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unrepresented employees and that the District had denied its request. In an interim 
decision issued in that case,3 the ALJ found that the Association was defunct and, as a 
result of the Association's dissolution, even though there was an agreement between 
the District and the Association that covered the period July 1, 2000 through June 30, 
2004, it was not a bar to the petition. The ALJ's decision in that proceeding was 
expressly incorporated into the record in this case.4 
The District did not appeal that decision and thereafter signed a consent 
agreement that CSEA be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit formerly 
represented by the Association. By order dated January 23, 2002, this Board certified 
CSEA as the representative of the unit.5 Subsequently, on January 30, 2002, CSEA 
made a demand "to commence negotiations in order to modify the current collective 
bargaining agreement." The District responded on February 4, 2002 by advising CSEA 
that the District's contract with the Association was still in effect. The instant improper 
practice charge alleged an improper refusal to bargain. The District answered by 
asserting that the existing collective bargaining agreement is a bar to further 
negotiations until 2004. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ concluded that, upon CSEA's certification as the unit's representative, 
the District had an obligation to engage in negotiations with CSEA for a new collective 
bargaining agreement to be effective at the start of the District's next fiscal year. The 
3
 34 PERB ^4019 (2001). 
4
 36 PERB 1J4534 (2003). 
5
 35 PERB P000.01 (2002). 
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ALJ also found that CSEA had the right to administer the Association-District agreement 
until a successor agreement was negotiated. The District argues that the existing 
agreement between the Association and the District acted as a bar to any further 
negotiations with CSEA until the expiration of the agreement in June 2004. 
Section 208.1 (a) of the Act provides that: 
§208. Rights accompanying certification or recognition. 
1.A public employer shall extend to an employee organization 
certified or recognized pursuant to this article the following 
rights: 
(a) to represent employees in negotiations notwithstanding the 
existence of an agreement with an employee organization that 
is no longer certified or recognized, and in the settlement of 
grievances.... 
This language clearly supports the ALJ's determination that CSEA had the right upon 
certification to negotiate with the District for a new collective bargaining agreement, 
even though the prior agreement between the Association and the District does not 
expire until June 30, 2004. In City of Newburgh6, referring to Fraternal Order, New York 
State Troopers, Local 1908, AFSCME, AFL-CIO7, we reiterated that a newly certified or 
recognized employee organization obtains the right to negotiate a contract to succeed a 
predecessor agreement as of the date when it is certified or recognized. In County of 
Rockland,8 we held that: 
Section 208.1(a) grants to a newly certified or recognized 
employee organization the immediate right to negotiate for 
employees in the unit even though there may still be in existence 
an unexpired agreement entered into with the former 
representative. In other words, the commencement of 
6
 20 PERB 1J3017 (1987). 
7
 5 PERB H3060 (1972). 
8
 10 PERB P098, at 3169-70 (1977). 
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negotiations by the newly designated representative is not to be 
deferred until the existing agreement runs out. 
It is clear, therefore, that CSEA has the statutory right upon certification to negotiate a 
successor to the Association-District collective bargaining agreement and that the 
District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it refused to negotiate with CSEA. 
Our analysis does not end there, however. In deciding the initial representation 
case, the ALJ determined that the Association had become defunct by virtue of the 
employees' resolution to disband the Association and subsequently seek representation 
by CSEA.9 Neither the District nor CSEA appealed the ALJ's decision. They thereafter 
entered into an agreement consenting to CSEA's certification by this Board as the 
exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the unit previously represented by the 
Association. 
The issue of whether the Association is defunct is not before us in this 
proceeding. The Association's status was decided by the ALJ in the previous 
representation case and, because that decision was not appealed by the District, it is a 
final decision.10 The District's exceptions as to this issue are, therefore, not properly 
raised in this case and will not be addressed in this decision. 
We held in Eastchester Union Free School District^, that "[a]n employee 
organization exists for purposes of the [Act] to negotiate and administer collective 
bargaining agreements. When an organization makes a clear and conscious decision to 
9
 Supra note 2. 
10
 Act, §213(a); Rules, §213.6(b). 
11
 28 PERB H3064, at 3147(1995). 
Board - U-23450 - 6 
entirely stop representing employees with respect to their employment, it must be 
defunct for purposes of the Act." As a result, we have held, that when a bargaining 
agent becomes defunct, the employees who were previously represented by that union 
become unrepresented.12 
We here find that as of the date of the Association's dissolution, the employees in 
the unit it previously represented became, for purposes of the Act, unrepresented 
employees. Where employees who were previously represented become unrepresented 
employees due to the dissolution of their bargaining representative, what becomes of 
the collective bargaining agreement between the defunct employee organization and 
the public employer? We have not had the opportunity to decide this question before. 
The ALJ did not decide the current status of the agreement negotiated with the 
Association, although she opined that CSEA had been substituted as the administrator 
of the agreement and further stated that the terms must be continued pursuant to §209-
a.1(e) of the Act. We do not agree with the ALJ's holding on this issue. 
We find that, as of the date of the Association's dissolution, the employees in the 
bargaining unit represented by the Association became unrepresented employees.13 
Indeed, it is because these employees were unrepresented that CSEA's petition was 
timely filed in the representation case.14 When one of the parties to the Association-
District collective bargaining agreement ceased to exist, that agreement became null 
12
 Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB1J3029 (1995). 
13
 See Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist, 3 PERB 1J4021 (1970). 
14
 34 PERB 1J4019 (2001). See Rules, §201.3(b). 
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and void. As found by the Supreme Court, Albany County, in Evangelisto v. Newman,™ 
§201.12 of the Act: 
defines "agreement," inter alia, as "the result of the exchange of 
mutual promises between the chief executive officer of a public 
employer and an employee organization which becomes a binding 
contract." Under such a definition, the only parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement are the public employer and the union.... 
Likewise, in Cuba-Rushford Central School District v. Rushford Faculty 
Association™, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that when a school 
district had been dissolved and annexed by a reorganized school district, the collective 
bargaining agreement between the dissolved school district and its employees expired 
as of the date the district ceased to exist. The court, citing to several PERB decisions, 
determined that the previous collective bargaining agreement did not survive the 
annexation and did not follow the employees of the former district hired by the 
reorganized district. 
Applying the same reasoning here, we find that when the Association became 
defunct, the collective bargaining agreement between the Association and the District 
was terminated. The employees in the unit have no independent right under the Act to 
enforce the terms of the Association-District agreement.17 What, then, are the terms 
and conditions of employment of these employees now? Even though the Association-
District collective bargaining agreement is null and void, the District is still obligated to 
maintain the status quo of the employees in the unit now represented by CSEA until a 
1519 PERB 1T7021, at 7027 (Sup.Ct. Albany County 1986). 
16
 182 AD2d 127, 25 PERB 1J7531 (4th Dep't 1992). 
17
 See Queens Coll. of the City Univ. of New York (Soffer), 21 PERB 1J3024 (1988). 
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new agreement is negotiated. We have previously held that changes in prevailing 
employment conditions after a bona fide representation question has been raised 
violate §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act.18 In Onondaga-Cortland-Madison SOCES,19 we 
reiterated an employer's duty under the Act to maintain the status quo as to terms and 
conditions of employment for members of a newly certified bargaining unit until a wage 
and benefit package was fixed by collective negotiations with the certified bargaining 
agent. The status quo for these employees would be the terms and conditions of 
employment in existence at the time that CSEA filed its representation petition. Upon 
certification, CSEA assumed the right and responsibility to have the status quo 
maintained for unit employees until a new collective bargaining agreement is 
negotiated. 
Based upon the foregoing, we find that the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act 
when it refused CSEA's demand to negotiate a successor agreement to the 
Association-District collective bargaining agreement. 
The District's exceptions are denied and the decision of the ALJ is affirmed, as 
modified. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. The District bargain collectively with CSEA over terms and conditions 
of employment for unit employees upon demand; and 
1B
 Genesee-Livingston-Steuben-Wyoming BOCES, 29 PERB fl3065 (1996). 
19
 25 PERB 1J3044 (1992), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Onondaga-Cortland-
Madison Bd. of Cooperative Educ. Servs. v Kinsella, 198 AD2d 824, 26 PERB 1J7015 
(4th Dep't 1993), motion for leave to appeal denied, 81 NY2d 706 (1993). See also 
Town of Shawangunk, 33 PERB fl3054 (2000). 
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2. The District sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally 
used to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
(AAA^cJuoLyY^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Avon Central School District in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Ontario County Local 835, Avon 
Central School District Employee Unit, that the Avon Central School District will: 
Bargain collectively with CSEA over terms and conditions of employment for unit employees 
upon demand. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
AVON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, 
or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT 
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, ILA, LOCAL 2013, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23131 
STATE OF NEW YORK (UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM), 
Respondent, 
- and -
NEW YORK STATE COURT OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
PAT BONANNO, ESQ, for Charging Party 
LAUREN P. DE SOLE, ESQ. (RICHARD MC DOWELL of counsel), for 
Respondent 
WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA (NORMA MEACHAM of counsel), 
for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State 
Supreme Court Officers Association, ILA, Local 2013, AFL-CIO (SCOA) to a 
denial by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of SCOA's request for the issuance 
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of a subpoena ad testificandum for approximately 37 employees assigned to the 
Mobile Security Patrol of the State of New York, Unified Court System (UCS) and 
a subpoena duces tecum for the production by UCS of any overtime from the 
inception of the Mobile Security Patrol to date or the time sheets of all of the 
court officers, including supervisors, assigned to the Mobile Security Patrol. 
These employees are represented by the New York State Court Officers 
Association (COA). 
EXCEPTIONS 
The ALJ's denial of the subpoena request was a general denial. SCOA 
argues that the ALJ erred in not articulating the rationale for the denial. Both UCS 
and COA support the ALJ's ruling and argue against SCOA's exceptions. 
DISCUSSION 
SCOA's exceptions are before us as an interlocutory appeal of the ALJ's 
ruling during the processing of this improper practice charge. 
As a general rule, this Board will not review the interlocutory 
determinations of the Director or an Administrative Law Judge 
until such time as all proceedings below have been concluded, 
and review may be had of the entire matter (citation omitted). It 
is only when extraordinary circumstances are present and/or in 
which severe prejudice would otherwise result if interlocutory 
review were denied that we will entertain a request for such 
review.1 
SCOA is not unfamiliar with this holding as this is the third interlocutory 
appeal it has filed in this matter.2 There has been no showing by SCOA that 
1
 County of Nassau, 22 PERB 1J3027, at 3066 (1989). 
2
 State of New York (Unified Court System), 35 PERB tf3021 (2002); State of 
New York (Unified Court System), 35 PERB 1J3032 (2002). 
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there are extraordinary circumstances present or severe prejudice which would 
result if its interlocutory appeal was denied. Subpoenas may be issued by the 
attorney of record,3 or an attorney may obtain a subpoena duces tecum from a 
court.4 PERB's Rules of Procedure, §211.1(b), also specify that this agency's 
power to issue subpoenas shall in no way "affect the right of any person or entity 
to issue a subpoena pursuant to law." 
The Court of Appeals held in Irwin v. Board of Regents of the University of 
the State of New York,5 that, where an administrative agency derives its 
subpoena power from a specific statutory grant, both CPLR §2302(a) and §2307 
are inapplicable and that attorneys do not have the authority granted generally 
under those provisions to issue subpoenas in administrative proceedings. The 
Appellate Division, Third Department, later interpreted that holding in Moon v. 
New York State Department of Social Services6 and found that, in the absence of 
language in the grant of subpoena power to an agency or in the agency's own 
regulations delegating the subpoena authority to its hearing officers referring to 
the power of attorneys to issue subpoenas, attorneys could not issue subpoenas 
3
 CPLR 2302(a). See also, David D. Siegel, New York Practice, 579 (2d ed. 
1991). 
4
 CPLR 2302(b). 
527NY2d292(1970). 
6
 207 AD2d 103 (3d Dep't 1995). 
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in administrative proceedings.7 Following the reasoning of Moon, we conclude 
that because our statutory grant8 of subpoena power provides that subpoenas 
issued by PERB will be "regulated and enforced under the [CPLR]" and our own 
Rules specifically preserve the right of any person or entity to issue a subpoena 
pursuant to law, attorneys have the authority to issue subpoenas in PERB 
proceedings.9 
There being no grounds presented which meet our standards for an 
extraordinary interlocutory review, we will not consider SCOA's interlocutory 
appeal of the ALJ's denial of the subpoena request at this stage of the 
proceeding. 
It appears that one final caution is necessary here. We noted in our earlier 
decision on SCOA's second interlocutory appeal,10 that "SCOA's interests in this 
matter would, perhaps, be better served by prosecuting the instant charge, rather 
7
 The Appellate Division held, at 105, that: 
Neither the statute nor the relevant regulation which delegates the 
subpoena power of the Commissioner of Social Sevices to 
Hearing Officers (18 NYCRR 519.15[a]) refers to a party's 
attorney. Equally as significant is the absence of a proviso similar 
to that attached to the general subpoena provisions of State 
Administrative Procedures Act §304(2), which states "[njothing 
herein contained shall affect the authority of an attorney to issue 
such subpoenas under the provisions of the [CPLR]." 
8
 Act, §205.5 (k). 
9
 See Del Vecchio v. White Plains Unit, Westchester Co. Chapter, CSEA, Inc., 
Local 860, 64 AD2d 975 (2d Dep't 1978) and City of Albany v. Albany Prof. 
Permanent Firefighters Ass'n, 66 Misc.2d 822, 4 PERB ^8011 (Sup. Ct. Albany 
County 1971). 
35 PERB H3032, at 3089 (2002). 
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than interlocutory appeals which do not even approach the standard we have set 
for such a review of the interim rulings of an ALJ." SCOA should be mindful that 
continued meritless interlocutory appeals might be construed as an abuse of 
process, an attempt to delay an administrative proceeding or tactics resulting in 
an unnecessary expenditure of time and resources by PERB and might warrant 
harsher action than denial of an interlocutory appeal.11 
For the reasons set forth above, SCOA's interlocutory appeal is denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
'J 
, '4 n 
MarcrA. Abbott, Member 
'Jotfin T. Mitchell, Member 
11
 Matter of Thomas P. Halley, 30 PERB H3023 (1997). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5282 
CITY OF RENSSELAER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Account Clerk (Purchasing Department), Account Clerk (Planning 
Department), Deputy City Clerk, Deputy Commissioner (Water 
Certification - C-5282 - 2 -
Department), Pump Operator, Meter Reader, Clerk (Police 
Department, Building Inspector, Senior Clerk (Department of Public 
Works), City Accountant, Clerk (Treasurer's and Water 
Departments), Senior Clerk (Police Department), Part-time Clerk 
(Planning Department), Clerk (Assessment Department), Rehab 
Specialist, Assistant Director of Planning. 
Excluded: Commissioner of Assessments, Deputy Treasurer, Director of 
Youth, Mayor's Secretary, Senior Accountant, Account Clerk 
(Treasurer), Deputy Commissioner of Public Works, Deputy Police 
Chief, Computer Programmer, Secretary (Civil Service 
Department), and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R- Cuevas, Chairman 
A. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALBANY COUNTY NURSING HOME PROFESSIONAL 
STAFF ASSOCIATION/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5272 
COUNTY OF ALBANY (DEPARTMENT OF RESIDENTIAL 
HEALTH CARE FACILITIES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Albany County Nursing Home Professional 
Staff Association/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon 
by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: Pastoral Care Director, Pharmacy Director, Superintendent of 
Buildings and Grounds, Director Dietary Services, Director of 
Physical Therapy, Director of Occupational Therapy, Assistant 
Dietetic Serv. Supervisor, Asst. Dir. Of Nursing in Service 
Education, Assistant Pharmacy Director, Physician Asst/N.P., 
Supervising Nurse, Supervising Nurse P.T., Occupational 
Therapist, Recreational Therapist, Respiratory Therapist, Physical 
Therapist, Physical Therapist P.T., Pharmacist FT., Dietician R.D., 
Social Worker, Medical Social Worker, Volunteer Program 
Coordinator, Dietary Service Supervisor, Pharmacy Aide, Social 
Worker Assistant, Data Entry Clerk, User Specialist Clerk, 
Accountant II, Account Clerk I, Account Clerk II, Payroll Supervisor, 
Clerk I, Ward Clerk, Clerk Steno I, Clerk Typist II, Clerk Typist I, 
Medical Records Clerk, Medical Records Technician, Secretary I, 
Switchboard Operator, Senior Store Clerk, Maintenance Inventory 
Clerk, Supervisor Central Supply Clerk, Head Cook, Supervising 
Food Service Helper, Food Service Training Instructor, Bldg. 
Grounds Maintenance Supervisor, Head Groundsman, Custodial 
Work Supervisor II, Custodial Work Supv., Custodial Work Supv. I, 
Laundry Supervisor, I.D.C. Nurse, RN Recruitment Nurse, Senior 
Stores Clerk, Security Guards, Buildings Ground Maintenance, 
Part-time Messenger, Director of Social Work Services, Activities 
Program Director, Rehabilitation R.N., Clinical Assistant, Chef, 
RUGS RN. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Albany County Nursing Home Professional Staff 
Association/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
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obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc ArAbbottT Member 
< 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
J 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF ROSENDALE POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5299 
TOWN OF ROSENDALE, 
Employer, 
-and-
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE 
OFFICERS, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Rosendale Police Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
Certification - C-5299 - 2 -
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time and part-time employees of the Rosendale Police 
Department. 
Excluded: Chief of Police and Deputy Chief of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Rosendale Police Benevolent Association. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
j£ 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 1105, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5278 
ISLIP TERRACE FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
J CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Communication Workers of America, Local 
1105 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-
named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as 
their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
,/ settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All full-time, part-time firehouse attendants, including call-in 
firehouse attendance and maintenance personnel. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Communication Workers of America, Local 1105. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 18, 2003 
Albany, New York 
Michael?R. Cuevas, Chairman 
